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Interaction, Identity, and Influence in the U.S. Senate, 1973-2009 
 
 
Abstract 
This article reconciles two seemingly incompatible expectations about 
interpersonal interaction and social influence. One theoretical perspective predicts 
that an increase in interaction between two actors will promote subsequent 
convergence in their attitudes and behaviors, while another view anticipates 
divergence. We examine the role of political identity in moderating the effects of 
interaction on influence. Our investigation takes place in the U.S. Senate—a 
setting in which actors forge political identities for public consumption based on 
the external constraints, normative obligations, and reputational concerns they 
face. We argue that interaction between senators who share the same political 
identity promotes convergence in their voting behavior, while interaction between 
actors with opposing political identities leads to divergence. Moreover, we 
theorize that the consequences of political identity for interpersonal influence 
depend on the local interaction context: Political identity’s effects on influence 
are greater in more divided Senate committees than in less divided ones. We find 
support for these hypotheses in analyses of data, spanning over three decades, of 
voting behavior, interaction, and political identity in the Senate. These findings 
contribute to research on social influence; elite integration and political 
polarization; and identity theory. 
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The consequences of interpersonal interaction for social influence—for example, how 
contact between individuals and groups can lead to shifts in their respective attitudes, beliefs, or 
behavior—have been longstanding concerns for both sociologists and social psychologists (De 
Groot 1974; French 1956; Marsden 1981). Indeed, the interplay of interaction and influence has 
animated research on topics as wide-ranging as attitude change in small groups (e.g., Friedkin 
1999), risk-taking in individual versus group settings (e.g., Cartwright 1971), the polarization of 
public opinion and political ideology (e.g., Baldassarri and Gelman 2008), and the role of elites 
in promoting similarity in corporate behavior (e.g., Mizruchi 1989). 
 Across these diverse contexts, a central line of inquiry has united research on social 
influence: How do proximity and the frequency of interaction affect the tendency for actors’ 
attitudes, beliefs, or behavior to either converge or diverge? One set of conceptual arguments has 
emphasized convergence. Friedkin (1993: 862-863) succinctly summarizes this view: “Frequent 
communication tends to embed opinions in a supporting fabric of arguments and information…. 
Hence the pressure toward uniformity of opinions that arises from a comparison of opinions…is 
likely to be more pronounced and sustained when issue-related communication is frequent.” An 
alternative perspective has instead highlighted divergence and group polarization—stemming, 
for example, from social comparisons (e.g., Baron et al.1996), persuasive arguments (e.g., 
Burnstein 1982), and repeated attitude expressions (e.g., Brauer, Gliner, and Judd 1995).   
In line with attempts to integrate these disparate research traditions (e.g., Baldassarri and 
Bearman 2007; Friedkin 1999), we seek to deepen our understanding of the conditions under 
which heightened interaction leads to convergence or divergence in attitudes and behaviors.  
Building on the burgeoning literature on political networks (McClurg and Lazer 2014; Parigi and 
Bearman 2008; Parigi and Sartori 2014), we situate our investigation in the context of the United 
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States Senate from 1973 to 2009. Although social attitudes in the U.S. have, with few exceptions, 
not become more polarized in recent years (DiMaggio, Evans, and Bryson 1996; Fiorina and 
Abrams 2008), the U.S. Senate has witnessed marked increases in political polarization during 
this period (Hetherington 2001; McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006). As Poole and Rosenthal 
(1997: 232) presciently concluded from their seminal study of voting behavior in Congress: “The 
degree of polarization in Congress is approaching levels not seen since the 1890s…. Intense 
conflict between…parties will continue.” Given that senators have coherent, visible, and 
resonant political identities and seek to exert influence over one another through interaction, the 
U.S. Senate is an apt setting for the study of interaction, identity, and influence.  
In this article, we strive to make three main contributions. First, we provide an account of 
increased polarization in the U.S. Senate that complements prevailing explanations such as the 
geographic sorting of voters along partisan lines and the growing importance of political activists 
who are themselves more polarized (Theriault 2008). We do not seek to adjudicate among these 
macro-level explanations; rather, our aim is to uncover the microfoundations of these behavioral 
shifts. To do so, we draw on a rich dataset of period-to-period changes in the distance between 
pairs of senators on a well-established measure of political voting behavior (Poole and Rosenthal 
1997) and their proximity to one another in physical and social space, as defined by their seat 
locations on the chamber floor and committee co-membership, respectively. Second, we help to 
reconcile the competing theoretical perspectives on interaction and behavior change by 
highlighting the moderating role of political identity. To preview our findings, we show that 
greater interaction among senators sharing the same political identity resulted in convergence in 
their subsequent attitudes and behaviors, while an increase in contact among senators with 
opposing political identities led to divergence. Finally, our work shows how the local context in 
5 
 
which interaction occurs can moderate the effects of identity on social influence. We report 
evidence that political identity played a role in voting behavior change in more divided Senate 
committees but did not matter in less divided ones. 
In the remainder of the article, we first ground our work in network-analytic approaches 
to social influence. We then derive hypotheses about how political identity moderates the effects 
of interaction on influence and about the local contexts in which political identity matters most. 
Next, we describe the research setting, analytical approach, and empirical results. We conclude 
with implications of our findings for research on social influence, elite integration and political 
polarization, and social identity.  
 
THEORY 
Network-Analytic Approaches to Social Influence 
As Marsden and Friedkin (1993: 127) note, “The study of social influence is a strategic arena for 
social network research; it links the structure of social relations to attitudes and behaviors of the 
actors who compose a network.”  Early conceptual work in this vein began with simple 
mathematical formulations, which described the structural origins of group consensus (De Groot 
1974; French 1956; Harary 1959). Later work accounted for group outcomes that fell short of 
full consensus (Friedkin and Johnson 1990; Marsden 1981).  
A prominent formulation, referred to as social influence network theory (Friedkin 1998), 
suggests that a person’s attitudes and behaviors can change both endogenously through the 
influence of others and exogenously by the conditions that formed their original views. We draw 
on a recent conceptualization (Baldassarri and Bearman 2007), which assumes that actors hold 
multiple opinions on diverse issues, that their overall perspective can be characterized by 
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aggregating their views on these issues, that their views are susceptible to influence from all 
other actors to whom they are connected, and that attitude and behavior change occurs through 
interaction with others who have similar or opposing views. We turn next to explicating the role 
of political identity in this approach to social influence.  
Political Identity in the U.S. Senate 
Identity is a core feature of social life and a key theoretical construct in psychology (Ellemers 
and Haslam 2012; Hogg and Turner 1985; Tajfel and Turner 1979), sociology (Burke and Stets 
2009; Hogg and Ridgeway 2003; McCall and Simmons 1978; Stryker and Burke 2000), and 
political science (Fowler and Kam 2007; Ringe, Victor, and Gross 2013; Schildkraut 2011; 
Shayo 2009). Identity involves “the recognition of and participation in a web of social relations 
or communities that envelop the self and through which individuals feel themselves as identical 
with others” (Berezin 2001: 84). It is often multifaceted, as people relate to and derive meaning 
from multiple communities of similar selves (Agnew and Brusa 1999; Calhoun 1993). People 
possess both private identities, which are informed by emotion and tradition, and public 
identities, which are governed by interest and rationality. We focus on a particular kind of 
identity—political identity—that has both private and public elements (Berezin 2001; Kanazawa 
2000; Somers 1993).  
In the U.S. Congress, senators forge political identities for public consumption based on 
external constraints, such as promises they made on the campaign trail and to key donors; 
normative obligations, such as commitments they made to party leaders and the history of prior 
support they received from colleagues; and reputational concerns, such as the extent to which 
they are known for hewing to and reinforcing the party line. In the Senate, perhaps the most 
salient manifestation of political identity is party affiliation. Each of the two main parties—
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Republican and Democratic—has a collective political reputation, shared leadership, a common 
party line, a history of supporting and sanctioning same-party colleagues, and a common 
opponent in the form of the other party. At the same time, political identities in the Senate can 
also transcend party boundaries. For example, two senators from states that have shared 
economic interests or matching levels of religiosity may construct similar political identities, 
while those whose constituents have competing economic, social, or moral interests may fashion 
opposing identities.  
Political Identity and Social Influence 
Once an identity—including a political identity—is deemed salient, the normative pressures 
defined by that identity lead people to think and act in ways that conform to the norms of the 
identity group. That is, when activated, identities create the conditions for social influence (for a 
review, see Abrams and Hogg [1990]). Specifically, the process unfolds in the following steps: 
(1) people define themselves as members of a social category—for example, a group defined by 
party affiliation; (2) they learn the expected and desirable behaviors that are correlated with 
membership in that category; (3) they assign the norms and attributes of the category to 
themselves through a process of internalization; and (4) their behavior changes to conform to the 
norm as their category membership becomes more salient (Turner and Reynolds 2012).  
Experimental evidence from social psychology supports this conceptualization. For 
example, subjects in an experimental study were better able to recall information they thought 
relevant to the group with which they identified, than information considered not relevant to that 
group (Maitner et al. 2010). Similarly, in another study, subjects were more likely to change their 
attitudes in response to arguments they perceived were made by members of their identity group 
than to arguments they thought were made by people not in their identity group (Mackie and 
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Cooper 1984). Outside of the laboratory setting, a longitudinal field study found that students’ 
political views were more likely to converge when they shared a positive tie than when they did 
not share a positive tie (Lazer et al. 2010). Finally, agent-based simulations of group dynamics 
have shown that interaction among actors with shared identity in the form of a positive 
relationship reduces the ideological distance between them (Kitts 2006; Macy et al. 2003). 
In the U.S. Senate, identity-based sources of social influence are amplified because of the 
fundamental oppositional nature of the two main political parties. In a sense, we can think of 
senators from the same party as having a positive tie to one another in terms of their political 
identity—even if they have an acrimonious personal relationship. Conversely, senators who are 
across the aisle in terms of party affiliation have a negative tie to one another regardless of 
whether they have an amicable or antagonistic personal relationship (cf. Almquist and Butts 
2013). These positive and negative ties of political identity create strong normative pressure to 
conform to the expected attitudes and behaviors of a senator’s party or other salient political 
identity group. Because senators (like most people) have a desire to maintain a positive self-
concept, thinking or acting in ways that violate these expectations creates cognitive dissonance, 
which in turn causes attitudes and behaviors to fall in line with expectations (Aronson 1968; 
Festinger 1957; Stone and Cooper 2001; Thibodeau and Aronson 1992). Thus, when two people 
sharing the same political identity come into greater contact with one another, their shared 
political identity becomes more salient and the normative pressure to reach alignment in thoughts 
and action increases. Moreover, strategic and public self-presentations, of the kind that senators 
routinely undertake when they interact with each other, tend to produce lasting changes in views 
of the self and behavior change that persists across social settings (Schienker, Dlugolecki, and 
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Doherty 1994). We therefore argue that an increase in interpersonal interaction between senators 
sharing the same political identity will lead to convergence in voting behavior. Thus, we posit: 
 
Hypothesis 1a: The more senators with the same political identity interact with one 
another, the more their subsequent voting behavior will tend to converge.   
 
How can we expect an increase in contact between people with opposing political 
identities to change their attitudes and behaviors? One set of insights comes from the agent-based 
simulations mentioned above. These studies have also shown that interaction among actors who 
are negatively tied to one another increases distance and leads to group polarization (Kitts 2006; 
Macy et al. 2003). Another perspective suggests that interaction among people with opposing 
views can result in compromise or conflict, depending on their relative positions on a broader set 
of topics. As Baldassari and Bearman (2007: 792) note: “If [two actors] have contrasting views 
on a focal issue, but share similar opinions on the remaining issues, they compromise by 
reducing their commitment on the salient issue, thus moving closer to each other. In contrast, if 
they disagree on other issues, their commitment to the focal issue is reinforced and their opinions 
diverge further.” In already polarized settings such as the U.S. Senate, heightened interaction 
among senators with opposing political identities will lead to divergence in voting behavior 
because the senators’ conflicting identities will become more salient and the normative pressure 
to move further apart in thoughts and action will intensify. Subject to the scope condition of pre-
existing polarization, we therefore expect:     
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Hypothesis 1b: The more senators with conflicting political identities interact with one 
another, the more their subsequent voting behavior will tend to diverge. 
 
Local Context—Degree of Past Division in Committees 
Having contended that political identity will moderate the effects of interaction on social 
influence, we turn next to exploring how the local context in which interaction occurs can 
amplify or dampen this effect. We posit that group contexts in which members have experienced 
past division across identity group lines will tend to make political identities more salient. By 
contrast, political identities will matter less in group contexts in which members have 
collaborated effectively in the past across identity group lines. Thus, political identity can be 
expected to play a more important role in moderating the effects of interaction on identity in the 
former context, relative to the latter.  
In the U.S. Senate, the committees on which senators serve and deliberate on key issues 
represent one of the most prominent contexts for local interaction. Within these committees 
senators discuss, debate, and amend preliminary pieces of legislation, or bills, which are assigned 
to them by the broader legislative body. Committee deliberations represent the most significant 
hurdle for the passage of bills: once a bill passes through committee, it has a high likelihood of 
becoming law (Fenno 1973). Committees are venues in which senators wrangle with one another 
over bills but also seek to collaborate with one another by co-sponsoring bills that matter to 
them, their constituents, and other key stakeholders. Because tradition dictates that party 
representation on committees should reflect the overall composition of the Senate, committees 
are key sites for both within-party and cross-party political interaction.  
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Committees vary considerably in membership, with some committees consisting of 
senators who have a track record of co-sponsoring bills extensively across party lines and others 
whose members have co-sponsored bills primarily within party lines. We can think of these 
different kinds of committees as varying in their level of past division. The former is less divided 
because senators on that committee have a history of working effectively across party lines, 
while the latter is more divided because senators on that committee have collaborated primarily 
within party lines.  
We suggest that the more divided a Senate committee is, the more likely it is to create a 
local interaction context in which senators’ political identities become salient. In a divided 
committee, where senators have not collaborated extensively across party lines, the political 
fissures between the two main parties will be more evident to committee members.
1
 Thus, the 
tendency for political identity to moderate the effects of interaction on voting behavior 
convergence will be amplified when senators’ interactions take place in the context of more 
divided committees. By contrast, interaction in the context of less divided committees is less 
likely to trigger identity-based sources of social influence because senators in such settings are 
surrounded by colleagues who have collaborated effectively across party lines. Together, these 
arguments suggest: 
 
Hypothesis 2: The tendency for political identities to influence the convergence or 
divergence of senators’ voting behavior will be greater in more divided Senate committees 
than in less divided committees.  
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DATA AND METHODS  
Empirical Setting: The United State Senate 
To test these hypotheses, we examined interactions, group contexts, and voting behavior changes 
in the Senate, the upper house of the U.S. national legislature. For four reasons, this empirical 
setting was especially well-suited to our theoretical aims. First, senators’ voting behavior is part 
of the public record, and the (changing) distance in voting behavior between each pair of 
senators can be readily observed. Second, senators interact with one another in multiple, 
observable settings, including the Senate Chamber and a range of committees (Deering and 
Smith 1997). We can therefore derive two distinct indicators of interpersonal interaction. Third, 
we can characterize the local interaction context on different committees as more or less divided 
by drawing on the record of past bill co-sponsorships between each pair of same-party and 
different-party senators. Finally, because of the two party system in the U.S., senators construct 
political identities that are often in close alignment with or direct opposition to one another. In 
sum, the U.S. Senate represents a strategic site for the study of political identity, interaction, and 
influence.  
Our hypotheses focus on the tendency for interaction to lead to the convergence or 
divergence of voting behavior—that is, we theorize about changes in the voting distance between 
two senators. As a consequence, we analyzed interpersonal influence at the level of dyads, rather 
individuals. Dyads were the appropriate unit of analysis for another key reason: rather than 
assuming that actors had the same level of influence over all other actors, we instead allowed for 
heterogeneity in actors’ influence over other actors (Friedkin 1993: 865).2  
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Our analyses cover the years 1973 to 2009. This time frame allowed us to collate a rich 
dataset that encompassed a period of stable, two-party rule, with both parties occupying the 
White House at different times, and neither party outright dominating the other.  
Dependent Variable 
Because senators’ votes on contentious issues—for example, regulation of business practices, tax 
policy, and abortion rights—are often highly correlated, one can distill these votes into a 
composite measure of voting behavior (cf. Baldassarri and Bearman 2007). We adopted Nokken 
and Poole’s (2004) variant of a widely used measure of voting distance in the US Congress: 
Dynamic Weighted Nominate, or DW-Nominate. This approach extrapolates from each senator’s 
observed voting record to map each senator’s behavior in a given Congress onto a point in 
Euclidean space. In colloquial terms, one can think of this space as spanning the spectrum from 
“liberal” to “conservative” (Poole and Rosenthal 1997). Senators’ composite voting behavior can 
range from -1 (especially liberal) to 1 (especially conservative). We used this behavioral score to 
construct our dependent variable: the absolute voting distance between two senators within a 
given Congress, which can range from 0 to 2. Figure 1 depicts the distribution of this variable.  
*****Figure 1 about here***** 
Independent Variables 
We constructed two measures that proxy for the degree of interaction between senators. The first 
was based on geographic proximity. A long literature—dating back to Bossard’s (1932) seminal 
work on marriage selection and Festinger, Schachter, and Back’s (1950) treatise on spatial 
configurations—suggests that geographic proximity is one of the most salient determinants of 
interaction. To examine the effects of geographic proximity, we focused on the Senate 
chamber—a large, 16-by-26 meter room in which each senator is assigned a desk. It is in this 
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chamber that senators debate legislation, work to build consensus, and vote on bills. Every two 
years, after an election, the chamber map is redrawn, and chamber desks are rebolted to new 
locations on the floor. By tradition, each party is apportioned a side of the chamber floor and 
senators sequentially choose their desks in order of seniority. See Figure 2 for a graphic 
representation of the chamber. Using archives of seating locations, we mapped each senator’s 
desk location onto Cartesian space, and used these coordinates to construct the precise chamber 
distance between each pair of senators. Senators whose desks were closer together were more 
likely to interact with one another (Chown and Liu forthcoming). Hence, our first measure of 
interaction between senators was: Chamber Distance. Figure 3 depicts the distribution of this 
variable. 
*****Figure 2 about here***** 
*****Figure 3 about here***** 
The second measure considered the extent to which two individuals had overlapping sites 
of interaction within the Senate. Specifically, we counted the number of committees that two 
senators served on together, Committee Co-Memberships, within a Congress (Nelson and 
Stewart III 2011; Stewart III and Woon 2011).  Senate committees are formally constituted 
subgroups of the larger legislative body. After initial legislation in the form of a bill is drafted, it 
is then referred to the appropriate committee, which gathers information, holds hearings, and 
revises the bill. Most bills fail to garner sufficient support at the committee stage and are never 
voted on by the full Senate. Because a significant amount of senatorial work is conducted in 
committees, these groups represent a major locus of interpersonal interaction and influence. 
 Our theory suggests that the effects of interaction may lead to convergence or divergence 
of voting behavior, depending on the political identities of individuals. We use an individual’s 
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party affiliation (i.e., Democrat, Republican, or Independent) as an indicator of his or her 
political identity.
3
 Party affiliations define a senator’s core electorate and also trace his or her 
most likely alliance partners and sources of opposition within the chamber. Members of the same 
party typically seek to craft a common political agenda and are apt to lend one another political 
support, while members of differing parties are more likely to oppose one another. As a 
reflection of the importance of party affiliation, members of the same party are seated in separate 
halves of the Senate chamber and are designated as majority or minority members of a 
committee. Our measure of shared or contrasting political identity was Same Party, an indicator 
set to one for dyads in which both senators had the same party affiliation and to zero otherwise. 
To test Hypothesis 1, we interacted our measures of the intensity of interaction, Chamber 
Distance and Committee Co-Membership, with our indicator variable of shared political identity, 
Same Party. In supplemental analyses described below, we also generated an alternative measure 
of political identity based on the degree of religiosity among constituents of the states that 
senators represent. 
In developing Hypotheses 2, we theorized that contextual features of the groups in which 
interaction occurs will shape the tendency toward ideological convergence or divergence. To 
measure the level of past division that occurred in a committee, we used data on bill co-
sponsorships among U.S. senators (Fowler 2006a; Fowler 2006b). Bill co-sponsorships are 
public endorsements of support that one senator makes for another’s policy initiatives. In our 
data, within any given Congress, about 45% of bills received one or more co-sponsors.  
To capture the history of division within a committee, we generated the average number 
of bill co-sponsorships per dyadic pair on the committee, separated out by bill co-sponsorships 
that were within the same political party and those that were across party lines. For each 
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committee, we then measured the ratio of within-party to cross-party co-sponsorships (see Figure 
4). When this ratio is close to 1, bill co-sponsorships are just as likely to occur between senators 
from the same party as between senators from opposing parties. In such committees, cross-party 
division is low. By contrast, a ratio greater than 1 indicates that bill co-sponsorships are more 
likely to occur between senators from the same party than between senators from opposing 
parties. For these committees, division is expected to be high. As Figure 4 illustrates, committees 
vary considerably in past division. To capture this variation, we implemented a median split of 
committees based on their ratio of within- to cross-party co-sponsorships and then created two 
separate counts of shared committees of each type between pairs of senators.
4
 Finally, we created 
interaction terms of these committee co-membership counts and our measure of shared political 
identity, Same Party, to test Hypothesis 2. 
*****Figure 4 about here***** 
Estimation 
To examine the impact of changes in interaction on voting distance between two senators, we 
regressed voting distance in the next period on the degree of interpersonal interaction that 
occurred within the Senate in the present period. Formally, our baseline regression model is 
represented as:  
E[yijt+1|Xijt] = 0+1Chamber Distanceijt+2Commmittee Co-Membershipijt+3Xijt+t+ij+ijt, 
where y is the voting distance between i and j in the subsequent Congress, t+1, Chamber 
Distance is the geographic distance between senators i and j in meters in Congress t, Committee 
Co-Membership is a count of the committees shared by i and j in Congress t, X is a vector of 
control variables, t represents fixed effects for each Congress, and the ij corresponds to dyad 
fixed effects.  
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Importantly, the inclusion of dyad fixed effects allowed us to focus on within-dyad 
variation. In this specification, all time-invariant characteristics of individuals—for example, 
gender, party affiliation, starting ideology, or cohort—as well as characteristics of dyads—for 
example, whether two senators were of the same gender, were elected at the same time, or shared 
the same ideology at the time they were elected—were netted out. Put differently, we linked 
changes in voting distance, our dependent variable, to changes within the dyad (e.g., chamber 
distance or committee co-membership) over time. We controlled for any residual effects of 
increasing seniority in dyads by including the sum of their senate tenures and their changing 
personal relationship over time by including their history of bill co-sponsorships (logged). The 
inclusion of Congress fixed effects accounted for unobserved time heterogeneity—for example, 
years in which those elected to the Senate held especially extreme ideological views. 
Non-Independence of Observations 
The error terms in regressions of dyadic network data will be correlated across observations—a 
problem referred to as network autocorrelation (i.e., clustering). The failure to account for 
clustering can lead to under-estimated standard errors and over-rejection of hypothesis tests. To 
address this issue, we employed a variance estimator that enables cluster-robust inference 
(Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller 2011). This approach to adjusting standard errors is appropriate 
for the analysis of social network data (e.g., Dahlander and McFarland 2013; Kleinbaum, Stuart, 
and Tushman 2013). We also considered but decided against another alternative: stochastic 
actor-based models of the kind estimated using the software program, SIENA (Steglich, Snijders, 
and West 2006). These models assume a dichotomous dependent variable and become more 
difficult to estimate as the number of time periods increases (Snijders, van de Bunt, and Steglich 
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2010); thus, they are not appropriate for analyzing a data set in which the dependent variable is a 
distance measure and that spans such a long time period.  
Accounting for the Role of Selection onto Committees 
Although regressions with dyad fixed effects account for unobserved heterogeneity among 
individual senators and pairs of senators, questions about how senators sorted onto committees 
could still undermine our claims about the role of political identity in moderating the effects of 
interaction on influence. For example, it is conceivable that senators from the same party chose 
to jointly serve on a committee because they expected their behaviors to later converge. 
Alternatively, a senator from one party might have chosen to serve on a committee to block the 
influence of a senator from a different party whose voting patterns were diverging from her own. 
We addressed these concerns in two ways: (a) by reviewing institutional features and norms of 
the U.S. Senate that make it unlikely that senators chose committees or were assigned to 
committees in ways that could provide an alternative explanation for our findings; and (b) by 
explicitly accounting for selection onto committees in supplemental regression analyses.    
The committee assignment process in the Senate has three goals: (a) ensuring that each 
committee is staffed with the requisite number of senators; (b) responding to the preferences of 
individual senators; and (c) limiting direct personal conflict among senators who have 
overlapping preferences. After each election, the Senate Committee on Committees determines 
the size of each committee. Each party’s share of committee seats reflects the overall party 
composition of the Senate in that Congress. Although each party allocates its members to 
committees independently, both parties adhere to longstanding norms. First, members can retain 
their committee assignments for as long as they desire. Second, both parties defer to seniority 
when it comes to resolving competing demands. Finally, senators are limited to two major 
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committee assignments and one minor committee assignments (though exceptions are sometimes 
granted) (Deering and Smith 1997).  
 As a consequence of these norms, senators often do not receive their preferred committee 
assignments. For example, Senator Dan Quayle related the following experience:  
“You literally sit around in a room with a sheet of paper in front of you and pick 
committees in order of seniority. Foreign Relations had no vacancies. It would have been 
my first choice. My next choice was Finance. [Three other senators] took it before me, so 
I missed it. I said ‘Armed Service.’ It covers some of the same problems as Foreign 
Relations….On the second round, I wanted Governmental Affairs. But I sat there 
watching, and I saw that I could be third ranking on Labor and Human Resources. I 
noticed everyone was shying away from it. I didn’t have any interest in it, to tell you the 
truth. I hadn’t even thought of it. But if I were third ranking—and Bob Stafford retired 
next year, I could be second ranking—assuming Orrin Hatch is reelected. So I said to 
myself right there, “Why not take it? There are a lot of important policies there—
education, employment, labor. I took it on the spot” (Fenno 1989: 23-24).  
Concerns about anticipated alignment or misalignment in voting behavior did not factor into 
Senator Quayle’s account or other comparable accounts of how members chose or were assigned 
to their committees.  
 Although these institutional features significantly reduce concerns about the threat to 
causal inference from the process by which senators sorted onto committees, we nevertheless 
conducted supplemental analyses that directly accounted for this selection mechanism. In 
particular, we used an empirical approach that has gained acceptance in biostatistics and has 
since diffused to the social sciences: Inverse Probability of Treatment Weighted (IPTW) 
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estimation (Hernán, Brumback, and Robins 2001; Robins, Hernán, and Brumback 2000). This 
estimator is related to propensity-score matching (Rubin 2006) and similarly assumes that 
selection into treatment is based on observable characteristics (Azoulay, Ding, and Stuart 2009).  
We implemented the procedure in three steps. First, we estimated for each dyad in our 
sample the probability of serving together on at least one committee as a function of: Same 
Party—Democrat; Same Party—Republican; Same Cohort; Same Gender; and Same State. Next, 
we computed the inverse of this predicted probability. Finally, in the models pertaining to 
committee co-membership (i.e., those reported in Tables 5 and 6), we weighted observations by 
the inverse of these predicted probabilities. This methodology in effect created a quasi-random 
sample, giving more weight to atypical observations and less weight to typical ones.  
 
RESULTS 
We begin with a description of the data. Table 1, Panel A describes the characteristics of the 276 
senators in our dataset. The median senator was male and joined the Senate in 1979 (i.e., the 96th 
Congress). On average, 12 senators entered each Congress, although this number ranged widely 
from six to 21 in our sample. Across the entirety of our dataset, senators were evenly divided 
between political parties, and voting behavior was centered at 0. Table 1, Panel B describes 
characteristics of the 64,856 senator dyads in our data set. The median senator pair had a voting 
behavioral distance of 0.417, a chamber distance of approximately 10 meters, and sat on 0.57 
committees together. Table 2 shows the distribution of dyads by number of shared committees. 
Over 54% of dyads had no shared committees and 35% had just one. Less than 1% of dyads 
served on three or more committees together.  
*****Table 1 about here***** 
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*****Table 2 about here***** 
 
 Table 3 describes patterns in how the distance in voting behavior among pairs of senators 
changed over time. Across all Congresses, the mean distance between senators was 0.42 (on a 
scale ranging from 0 to 2), although this distance increased significantly over the observation 
period (column 1). Much of this increase in polarization was driven by cross-party (column 3), 
rather than within-party (column 2), changes. This increasing polarization could have resulted 
from incumbents shifting their behaviors to adopt more extreme positions, newcomers becoming 
increasingly radicalized, or both. To further illuminate these trends, we examined these changes 
within two subsets of dyads: senators who entered the Congress before the observation period 
(i.e., pre-existing senators, column 5) and entering senators (column 7). Aggregate increases in 
cross-party polarization arose from increases in voting distance in both sets of dyads.  
*****Table 3 about here*****  
 Our empirical analyses sought to explain shifts in voting distance stemming from changes 
in interaction, using two distinct indicators of interaction: geographic distance in the Senate 
Chamber and committee co-membership. The mean chamber distance between senators was 10 
meters. Given the allocation of chamber seats by party, the mean intra-party distance was 6 
meters, while the mean inter-party distance was 14 meters (see Figure 3). Between Congresses, 
the median senator moved 1.7 meters on the floor, though relocations tended to occur in the early 
years of a senator’s tenure. After the fifth Congress (i.e., 10 years of service), a senator typically 
settled into a fixed desk position on the Chamber floor. The mean number of committee co-
memberships was 0.5.  
Table 4 reports the first set of analyses pertaining to Hypotheses 1a and 1b: that an 
increase interaction, as indicated by greater physical proximity, between senators sharing the 
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same salient political identity will lead to subsequent convergence in voting behavior, while an 
increase in interaction between senators with oppositional political identities will lead to 
divergence. In Model 1, the baseline, we first examined the effects of interaction on voting 
distance, without taking into account senators’ political identities. Both Chamber Distance and 
Committee Co-Membership had a statistically significant effect. Interestingly, the two 
coefficients each indicated that the more two senators interacted with each other, the less similar 
their voting behaviors became in the subsequent period. In interpreting the effects, note that 
Chamber Distance and Committee Co-Membership are opposing indicators of interaction: an 
increase in chamber distance is associated with a decrease in interaction, while an increase in 
committee co-membership suggests more interaction.  
Our next set of analyses sought to unpack the aggregate effect of increased interaction on 
voting behavior change by considering the role of political identity. In Table 4, Model 2, we 
interacted Chamber Distance with the political identity indicator, Same Party. The main effect of 
same party membership, which was time-invariant, was subsumed by the dyad fixed effects. 
Results indicated that when two senators from the same party moved closer together on the 
chamber floor, their voting distance in the next period decreased. By contrast, when two senators 
from different parties moved closer together, their voting distance increased. For senators from 
the same party, a one standard deviation decrease in chamber distance resulted in a 10.4% 
decrease in voting distance while for different-party senators, a one standard deviation increase 
resulted in a 2.7% increase in voting distance.
5
  
Although these changes may seem modest, they are substantively meaningful when we 
consider the baseline stability in senators’ voting behavior. For the median cross-party dyad, 
there was only a 14.1% change over the observation period. Thus, a 2.7% increase in voting 
23 
 
distance represents nearly one-fifth of the lifetime change in voting behavior in the median cross-
party dyad. Another way to interpret the magnitude of this effect is to consider how it would 
affect the location of a focal dyad on the distribution of dyads by voting distance. If the median 
(i.e., 50
th
 percentile) same-party dyad moved one standard deviation closer together in the senate 
chamber, that dyad would move to the 45
th
 percentile of voting distance in the next period. In 
sum, changes in the physical proximity of senators on the chamber floor yielded modest yet 
perceptible shifts in their subsequent voting distance.  
Model 3 decomposed the same party variable into Same Party—Republican and Same 
Party—Democrat, and revealed no significant differences in political identity dynamics between 
the two major parties. Finally, Model 4 did not assume a linear relationship between chamber 
distance and the subsequent change in voting behavior. Instead, we introduced indicators that 
allowed us to flexibly identify the effects of especially close versus less close proximity on 
voting distance. Results indicated that the effects of chamber distance were more pronounced 
when senators come into especially close physical proximity, with effects tapering beyond 10 
meters.  
*****Table 4 about here***** 
Table 5, Model 5 reports results of the second set of analyses relating to Hypotheses 1a 
and 1b: the effects of committee co-memberships and political identities on voting behavior 
convergence or divergence. Consistent with Table 4, we found that same-party senators 
converged in their subsequent voting behavior when they experienced an increase in committee 
co-memberships. For median same-party dyads, each additional committee they served on 
together led to a 5.8% decrease in their subsequent voting distance. By contrast, different-party 
senators who served on more committees together tended to diverge in voting behavior. For the 
24 
 
median different-party dyad, each additional committee co-membership was associated with a 
1.1% increase in voting distance. These results were consistent for both parties, although 
Democrats exhibited greater influence on one another in voting behavior convergence than did 
Republicans (Model 6); the difference between these two coefficients was significant at the .005 
level.  
Model 7 did not assume a linear relationship between shared committees and voting 
behavior change; rather, we introduced two indicator variables to disentangle the effects of 
having one shared committee from that of having two or more shared committees. Results 
indicated a 4.5% decrease in voting distance when two senators from the same party went from 
serving on zero committees together to serving on one committee together. The same change in 
committee co-memberships led to a 0.9% increase in voting distance for different-party dyads. 
When same-party dyads went from having one shared committee to two or more shared 
committees, they experienced a further 5.4% decrease in voting distance. This same change in 
committee co-memberships led to a further 1.7% increase in voting distance for different-party 
dyads. Finally, Model 8 was an integrated model that considered how changes in Chamber 
distance and committee co-memberships jointly affected voting behavior change. The 
hypothesized effects were robust to the inclusion of both measures of interpersonal interaction. 
In sum, Models 1 through 8 provided strong support for Hypotheses 1a and 1b.
6
  
*****Table 5 about here*****  
 
Table 6 reports results that speak to Hypothesis 2: that the effects of political identity and 
interaction on voting behavior change will be greater in more divided committees than on less 
divided committees. Model 10 disaggregated committees into those that were above or below the 
median level of division and then interacted these two committee counts with the political 
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identity indicator, Same Party. In support of Hypothesis 2, the convergence or divergence in 
voting behavior held only for changes in co-memberships on more divided committees (Model 
10). For median same-party dyads, each increase in the number of divided committees served on 
together was associated with a 10.3% decrease in subsequent voting distance. For the median 
different-party dyad, each increase in the number of divided committees served on together was 
associated with a 1.4% increase in voting distance. The effect was not statistically significant for 
changes in co-memberships on committees with a more equitable ratio of same- to cross-party 
bill co-sponsorships. Moreover, these results were robust to the inclusion of chamber distance 
(Model 11).  
*****Table 6 about here*****  
To account for selection of senators to committees, we implemented an Inverse 
Probability of Treatment Weighted (IPTW) estimation approach. We first estimated the 
likelihood that two senators would serve on a committee together and then, in the second-stage, 
inverse weighted each observation by its predicted probability. Thus, this approach netted out 
observable correlates of joint selection to a committee. Results from this analysis (not reported) 
showed only negligible changes to our results in Tables 5 and 6 and assuaged concerns about 
endogeneity arising from senators self-selecting onto committees based on anticipated changes in 
voting behavior.  
Finally, we conducted a number of supplemental analyses (see Appendix) to ensure that 
our results were robust to alternative specifications and modeling choices. Our results were 
substantively unchanged when we estimated random effects models with time-invariant 
covariates, included time-varying covariates such as whether or not members of a dyad were 
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committee chairs in a given Congress, added controls for triadic closure, and modeled the 
dynamics of interaction and influence at the individual, rather than dyadic, level.  
Empirical Extension: Political Identities Based on the Religiosity of Senators’ Constituents. 
The analyses reported above provided evidence that one type of political identity, party 
affiliation, moderated the effects of interaction on behavioral convergence or divergence. To 
demonstrate the generalizability of these findings, we examined whether comparable moderation 
effects could be detected using a different measure of political identity. In particular, we 
conducted a supplemental analysis based on the degree of religiosity among constituents of the 
states that senators represented. Our theory predicts that senators from states with comparable 
rates of religiosity will construct matching political identities with respect to divisive social 
issues, while those from states with very different rates of religiosity will construct opposing 
political identities with respect to those same issues.  
We derived our state-level religiosity measure from responses to a Gallup poll that asked 
respondents the extent to which “religion is an important part of their daily life.”7 Importantly, 
this measure of religiosity was not highly correlated with party affiliation: although statistically 
significant, the correlation between being Republican and greater state religiosity was only 
0.063. Thus, political identities defined using this religiosity measure are distinct from political 
identities based on party affiliation.  
 Because our theory is predicated upon matching or oppositional identities, we identified 
the subset of senator dyads whose political identities with respect to constituent religiosity would 
be either closely aligned or opposing. To do so, we first arrayed states on a religiosity index that 
ranged from 0 to 100 and placed them into quartile bins. Next, we restricted our sample to dyads 
of senators representing states with either very high (top quartile) or very low (bottom quartile) 
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rates of religiosity. That is, we dropped senators from states with moderate (middle two 
quartiles) rates of religiosity. Then we created an indicator variable, Same State Religiosity, 
which was set to one for dyads in which both members came from states with very high or very 
low rates of religiosity. Because the middle of the distribution was dropped, the reference 
category was therefore dyads from states with sharply contrasting rates of religiosity. This 
analytical approach sought to parallel the identity dynamics that we theorized about and 
empirically assessed using party affiliation. In both cases, the indicator variable represented a 
positive tie in terms of political identity (regardless of whether the two senators had a positive or 
negative interpersonal relationship), and the reference category indicated a negative tie in terms 
of political identity.  
Table 7 reports results of these analyses. Model 12 provided the baseline and again 
showed a negative relationship between chamber distance and voting distance in the next period. 
Model 13 included the interaction of Same State Religiosity and Chamber Distance, which was 
negative and statistically significant.
8
 These results lent further support for Hypotheses 1a and 
1b, suggesting that a one standard deviation decrease in chamber distance (that is, an increase in 
interaction) was associated with a 2.8% decrease in voting distance for senators from states with 
the same level of state religiosity. By contrast, a one standard deviation decrease in chamber 
distance (that is, an increase in interaction) induced a 4.4% increase in voting distance for 
senators from states with sharply contrasting rates of religiosity. Model 14, indicated that these 
effects were robust to the inclusion of Same Party and its interaction with Chamber Distance.  
*****Table 7 about here*****  
Finally, in supplemental analyses (not reported), we found that when the sample was 
constructed based on dyads that came from states that were less starkly polarized in constituent 
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religiosity (for example, when dyads from states with the same religiosity were compared to 
dyads from states that were only one or two quartiles apart rather than three quartiles apart in 
religiosity), these effects were attenuated and not statistically significant. Taken together, these 
analyses support the contention that political identities—specifically political identities that 
match or are opposed to one another—moderate the effects of interaction on the tendency for 
attitudes and behaviors to converge or diverge.  
 
DISCUSSION 
The goal of this article has been to contribute to our understanding of the conditions under which 
interaction between actors leads to greater similarity in their attitudes and behavior and the 
conditions under which it promotes dissimilarity. Our empirical context was the U.S. Senate, 
where senators forge political identities for public consumption in response to the external 
constraints, normative pressures, and reputational concerns they face. We first argued that 
greater interaction between senators with the same political identity will promote subsequent 
convergence in their voting behavior. Next, we posited that more interaction between senators 
with opposing political identities will lead to divergence in their voting behavior. Finally, we 
considered how the local context in which interaction occurs can affect the extent to which 
political identity motivations are made salient and thereby condition the effect of political 
identity on influence. We argued that the effects of political identity on interaction and voting 
behavior change will be greater in more divided interaction contexts than in less divided 
contexts.  
Empirical support for these propositions came from analyses of interaction, identity, and 
influence in the U.S. Senate from 1973 to 2009. Using two distinct indicators of political 
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identity, we demonstrated that, as the level of interaction between senators changed, their voting 
behavior converged or diverged as a function of their respective political identities. For political 
identity based on party affiliation, we found remarkable consistency in these patterns across two 
disparate indicators of interpersonal interaction—committee co-membership and physical 
proximity. Finally, our results indicated that the committee co-membership effect was 
concentrated in interactions that took place within more divided Senate committees but was not 
operative in less divided committees.   
Limitations 
That our findings proved robust across two distinct measures of political identity and two 
different indicators of social interaction bolsters confidence in our conclusions. Moreover, the 
use of stringent statistical controls (e.g., dyad fixed effects) helped address concerns about 
unobserved heterogeneity among individual senators and senator pairs. Nevertheless, concerns 
about the role of selection—for example, the possibility that senators sought to change their level 
of interaction with others because they anticipated moving closer or further apart in voting 
distance—cannot be fully eliminated. To address this concern, we explicitly modeled the 
probability of two senators sorting into the same committee and then weighted our observations 
by the inverse of these probabilities. Reassuringly, this analysis replicated our main findings. 
Still, our models could not account for unobserved, time-varying attributes of individuals or 
dyads that could have affected the dynamics of social influence. Thus, we cannot completely rule 
out the possibility of potentially confounding, unobserved attributes.  
 Moreover, because the U.S. Senate represents a specialized institutional setting, we urge 
caution in generalizing this paper’s findings to other contexts. That the hypothesized pattern of 
convergence and divergence held not only for political identity defined by party affiliation but 
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also for identity based on the religiosity of a senator’s constituents suggests that our findings 
may well generalize to social contexts in which oppositional groups with public identities come 
into contact with one another and seek to influence each other’s views and behavior. Examples 
of such contexts include labor-management relations and the enforcement of environmental 
regulations. We see great promise in future research that extends our theory and empirical 
approach into such settings. 
Contributions 
This study makes a number of noteworthy contributions. First, our findings help to reconcile two 
seemingly inconsistent expectations about the tendency of increased interaction to promote 
convergence or divergence of attitudes, beliefs, and behavior. Indeed, Bonacich and Lu (2012: 
216) list the question of “how groups become polarized or how two groups can become more and 
more different” as among the most important unsolved problems in sociology. By highlighting 
the moderating role of identity, this work informs research across a range of sociological 
subfields on when and how interaction leads to polarization.  
Scholars of opinion change in groups have, for example, noted the absence of consistent 
empirical evidence for negative influence—a mechanism that can help account for group 
polarization (for a review, see Mäs and Flache [2013]). Yet much of the empirical evidence on 
negative influence comes from laboratory settings, in which subjects lack a shared history, do not 
strongly dislike outgroup members, and discuss issues that are not especially important to them 
(Krizan and Baron 2007). The lack of consistent empirical support for negative influence has led 
mathematical sociologists to propose alternative mechanisms—for example, based on homophily 
and the content of communication among similar or dissimilar people—that can account for 
polarization (Mäs and Flache 2013). The present study does not discount these alternative 
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mechanisms. It does, however, provide compelling evidence that negative influence, which has 
heretofore been theorized and modeled in agent-based simulations and experiments (Mäs, 
Flache, and Kitts 2014), can be observed in interactions that take place in an important real-
world setting where people have shared histories, feel animosity toward outgroup members, and 
grapple with issues about which they care deeply. Moreover, whereas prior work has theorized 
about the role of identity in negative influence (Kitts 2000), this study provides empirical 
evidence of the role of oppositional political identities in social influence.  
 Similarly, a common theme in institutional theory centers on how interactions among 
actors in the same field promote convergence in their behaviors. Indeed, fields are often defined 
as settings where actors “partake of a common meaning system and … interact more frequently 
and fatefully with one another than with actors outside the field” (Scott 2001: 84; emphasis 
added). Research on geographic communities, for example, considers how interaction among 
elites promotes the convergence of corporate behaviors within communities that host multiple 
corporate headquarters (for a review, see Tilcsik and Marquis [2013]). Within such communities, 
executives from these different firms are assumed to interact with one another and then to “look 
to the actions of other locally headquartered companies for standards of appropriateness” 
(Marquis et al. 2007: 927). Along the same lines, upper-class social clubs in communities are 
thought to “provide institutionalized informal settings in which elites are socialized and socially 
controlled to adhere to normative business attitudes and behaviors” (Kono et al. 1998: 868). The 
findings from this study suggest the need to rethink and potentially revise these assumptions. 
They suggest that the tendency for an executive to emulate the actions of another executive from 
a different locally headquartered firm or to adopt the same norms and attitudes about business 
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may depend on the extent to which the two executives share a salient public identity and on the 
local context in which their interactions take place.  
Our work also provides novel insight for research on the coevolution of networks and 
political attitudes and ideology (e.g., Huckfeldt, Johnson, and Sprague 2004; Mutz 2002). For 
example, Lazer et al. (2010) found in a longitudinal field study that social, rather than task, ties 
among students were associated with subsequent convergence in their political ideology. They 
concluded that “persuasion may be more a function of affect than information transfer, and 
persuasion is unlikely to be a function merely of interaction frequency” (Lazer et al. 2010: 267). 
Our findings suggest the need to broaden this proposition to account for the roles of public 
identity and the local context of interaction. We would expect, for example, that social ties would 
promote convergence of political attitudes when two students share the same political identity 
but would either have no effect or even a negative effect on political alignment when two 
students have opposing political identities.  
 Second, these findings contribute to research on integration and disunion among elites 
(e.g., Hetherington 2001; McCarty et al. 2006; Mizruchi 1989; Poole and Rosenthal 1997). We 
provide insight into these dynamics in a setting that has served as perhaps the most important 
focal point for the study of elite polarization: the U.S. Senate. Whereas the polarization literature 
has tended to focus on the macro-structural factors, such as geographic sorting of voters along 
partisan lines (Theriault 2008), that have contributed to increased polarization in the Senate, our 
study illuminates a complementary set of explanations: the microfoundations of polarization that 
arise through subtle, day-to-day interactions among senators with shared or opposing political 
identities. Although compositional shifts in the Senate—for example, the tendency for people 
holding more extreme views to enter the chamber and for moderates to exit—likely account for 
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much of the increase in polarization, our work shows how interactions among senators during 
their period of joint service in the chamber may have exacerbated this tendency.  
Our theoretical arguments also provide an intriguing hint about the prospects for future 
political polarization. Were the macro-structural forces somehow reversed, such that the Senate 
comprised people with more moderate views, our arguments suggest that the tendency toward 
polarization resulting from interaction between senators from the two main parties might also 
diminish. Recall that we imposed an important scope condition on the tendency for people with 
opposing political identities to diverge in attitudes and behavior following interaction on a 
contentious issue: that they also tend to disagree on other issues beyond the focal issue. Thus, if 
senators from different parties had more common ground, interaction between them need not 
lead to further polarization. 
Finally, the present study importantly informs research on social psychological research 
on identity and influence (e.g., Baron et al. 1996; Hogg and Abrams 2003; Hogg and Ridgeway 
2003; Maitner et al. 2010). Whereas this literature has tended to focus on social influence 
between individuals in one-off interactions in laboratory settings (for a review and critique of 
this literature, see Mason, Conrey, and Smith [2007]), our investigation shows how the desire for 
a positive self-concept and the pressure to conform to norms consistent with salient identities 
(Aronson 1968; Thibodeau and Aronson 1992) operate in real-world settings, where actors are 
embedded in networks, have multiple public identities, and are engaged in repeated interactions 
over time (cf. Srivastava and Banaji 2011). Moreover, we bring to research on identity and 
influence fresh insight about the role of the structural context. Our findings indicate that identity 
matters for social influence in certain group settings—for example, senate committees with a 
history of past division—but not in others.    
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 In sum, this article illustrates the value of bringing together insights from sociology, 
political science, and social psychology in the study of the dynamics of social influence. This 
cross-disciplinary exchange promises to yield novel insight on how attitudes, beliefs, and 
behaviors form and evolve and about the interpenetration of identity and social structure.  
35 
 
References 
Abrams, Dominic and Michael A. Hogg. 1990. "Social Identification, Self-Categorization, and 
Social Influence." European Review of Social Psychology 1:195-228. 
Agnew, John and Carlo Brusa. 1999. "New Rules for National Identity? The Northern League 
and Political Identity in Contemporary Northern Italy." National Identities 1:117-133. 
Almquist, Zack W. and Carter T. Butts. 2013. "Dynamic Network Logistic Regression: A 
Logistic Choice Analysis of Inter- and Intra-Group Blog Citation Dynamics in the 2004 
US Presidential Election." Political Analysis 21:430-448. 
Aronson, Elliot. 1968. "Dissonance Theory: Progress and Problems." Pp. 5-27 in Cognitive 
Consistency Theories: A Source Book, edited by R. P. Abelson, E. Aronson, W. J. 
McGuire, T. M. Newcomb, M. J. Rosenberg, and P. H. Tannenbaum. Skokie, IL: Rand 
McNally. 
Azoulay, Pierre, Waverly Ding, and Toby E. Stuart. 2009. "The Impact of Academic Patenting 
on the Rate, Quality, and Direction of (Public) Research Output." Journal of Industrial 
Economics 57:637-676. 
Baldassarri, Delia and Peter Bearman. 2007. "Dynamics of Political Polarization." American 
Sociological Review 72:784-811. 
Baldassarri, Delia and Andrew Gelman. 2008. "Partisans without Constraint: Political 
Polarization and Trends in American Public Opinion." American Journal of Sociology 
114:408-446. 
Baron, Robert S., Sieg I. Hoppe, Chaun Feng Kao, Bethany Brunsman, Barbara Linneweh, and 
Diane Rogers. 1996. "Social Corroboration and Opinion Extremity." Journal of 
Experimental Social Psychology 32:537-560. 
Berezin, Mabel. 2001. "Emotions and Political Identity: Mobilizing Affection for the Polity." Pp. 
83-98 in Passionate Politics: Emotions and Social Movements, edited by J. Goodwin, J. 
M. Jasper, and F. Poletta. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 
Bonacich, Phillip and Philip Lu. 2012. Introduction to Mathematical Sociology. Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press. 
Bossard, James H. S. 1932. "Residential Propinquity as a Factor in Marriage Selection." 
American Journal of Sociology 38:219-224. 
Brauer, Markus, Melissa D. Gliner, and Charles M. Judd. 1995. "The Effects of Repeated 
Expressions on Attitude Polarization During Group Discussions." Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology 68:1104-1029. 
Burke, Peter J. and Jan E. Stets. 2009. Identity Theory. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
Burnstein, Eugene. 1982. "Persuasion as Argument Processing." Pp. 103-124 in Group Decision-
Making, edited by J. H. Davis and Stocher-Kreichgauer. New York: Academic Press. 
Burris, Val. 2005. "Interlocking Directorates and Political Cohesion among Corporate Elites." 
American Journal of Sociology 111:249-283. 
Calhoun, Craig. 1993. "Nationalism and Ethnicity." Annual Review of Sociology 19:211-239. 
Cameron, A. Colin, Jonah B. Gelbach, and Douglas L. Miller. 2011. "Robust Inference with 
Multi-way Clustering." Journal of Business and Economic Statistics 29:238-249. 
Cartwright, Dorwin. 1971. "Risk Taking by Individuals and Groups: An Assessment of Research 
Employing Choice Dilemmas " Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 20:361-
378. 
36 
 
Chown, Jillian and Christopher C. Liu. forthcoming. "Geography and Power in an 
Organizational Forum: Evidence from the U.S. Senate Chamber." Strategic Management 
Journal. 
Dahlander, Linus and Daniel A. McFarland. 2013. "Ties That Last: Tie Formation and 
Persistence in Research Collaborations over Time." Administrative Science Quarterly 
58:69-110. 
De Groot, Morris H. 1974. "Reaching a Consensus." Journal of the American Statistical 
Association 69:118-121. 
Deering, Christopher J. and Steven S. Smith. 1997. Committees in Congress. Washington, DC: 
Congressional Quarterly Press. 
DiMaggio, Paul, John Evans, and Bethany Bryson. 1996. "Have Americans' Social Attitudes 
Become More Polarized?" American Journal of Sociology 103:690-755. 
Dreiling, Michael and Derek Darves. 2011. "Corporate Unity in American Trade Policy: A 
Network Analysis of Corporate-Dyad Political Action." American Journal of Sociology 
116:1514-1563. 
Ellemers, Naomi and S. Alexander Haslam. 2012. "Social Identity Theory." Pp. 379-398 in 
Handbook of Theories of Social Psychology, vol. 2, edited by P. A. M. Van Lange, A. W. 
Kruglanski, and E. T. Higgins. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Fenno, Richard F. Jr. 1989. The Making of a Senator: Dan Quayle. Washington, DC: CQ Press. 
Festinger, Leon. 1957. A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance. Stanford, CA: Stanford University 
Press. 
Festinger, Leon, Stanley Schachter, and Kurt Back. 1950. "The Spatial Ecology of Group 
Formation." Pp. 141-161 in Social Pressure in Informal Groups, edited by L. Festinger, 
S. Schachter, and K. Back. Stanford, CA: Stanford University PRess. 
Fiorina, Morris P. and Samuel J. Abrams. 2008. "Political Polarization in the American Public." 
Annual Review of Political Science 11:563-588. 
Fowler, James H. 2006a. "Connecting the Congress: A Study of Cosponsorship Networks." 
Political Analysis 14:456-487. 
—. 2006b. "Legislative Cosponsorship Networks in the US House and Senate." Social Networks 
28:454-465. 
Fowler, James H. and Cindy D. Kam. 2007. "Beyond the Self: Social Identity, Altruism, and 
Political Participation." The Journal of Politics 69:813-827. 
French, John R.P., Jr. 1956. "A Formal Theory of Social Power." Psychological Review 65:181-
194. 
Friedkin, Noah E. 1993. "Structural Bases of Interpersonal Influence in Groups: A Longitudinal 
Case Study." American Sociological Review 58:861-872. 
—. 1998. A Structural Theory of Social Influence. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
—. 1999. "Choice Shift and Group Polarization." American Sociological Review 64:856-875. 
Friedkin, Noah E. and Eugene C. Johnson. 1990. "Social Influence and Opinions." Journal of 
Mathematical Sociology 15:193-206. 
Harary, Frank. 1959. "A Criterion for Unanimity in French's Theory of Social Power." Pp. 168-
182 in Studies in Social Power, edited by D. Cartwright. Ann Arbor, MI: Institute for 
Social Research. 
Hernán, Miguel A., Babette Brumback, and James M. Robins. 2001. "Marginal Structural 
Models to Estimate the Joint Causal Effect of Nonrandomized Treatments." Journal of 
the American Statistical Association 96:440-448. 
37 
 
Hetherington, Mark J. 2001. "Resurgent Mass Partisanship: The Role of Elite Polarization." 
American Political Science Review 95:619-631. 
Hogg, Michael A. and Dominic Abrams. 2003. "Intergroup Behavior and Social Identity." Pp. 
407-431 in The Sage Handbook of Social Psychology, edited by M. A. Hogg and J. 
Cooper. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Hogg, Michael A. and Cecilia L. Ridgeway. 2003. "Social Identity: Sociological and Social 
Psychological Perspectives." Social Psychology Quarterly 66:97-100. 
Hogg, Michael A. and John C. Turner. 1985. "Interpersonal Attraction, Social Identification and 
Psychological Group Formation." European Journal of Social Psychology 15:51-66. 
Huckfeldt, Robert, Paul E. Johnson, and John Sprague. 2004. Political Disagreement: The 
Survival of Diverse Opinions within Communication Networks. Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Kanazawa, Satoshi. 2000. "A New Solution to the Collective Action Problem: The Paradox of 
Voter Turnout." American Sociological Review 65:433-442. 
Kitts, James A. 2000. "Mobilizing in Black Boxes: Social Networks and Participation in Social 
Movement Organizations." Mobilization: An International Journal 5:241-257. 
—. 2006. "Social Influence and the Emergence of Norms Amid Ties and Amity and Enmity." 
Simulation Modelling Practice and Theory 14:407-422. 
Kleinbaum, Adam, Toby E. Stuart, and Michael L. Tushman. 2013. "Discretion within 
Constraint: Homophily and Structure in a Formal Organization." Organization Science 
24:1316-1336. 
Kono, Clifford, Donald Palmer, Roger Friedland, and Matthew Zafonte. 1998. "Lost in Space: 
The Geography of Corporate Interlocking Directorates." American Journal of Sociology 
103:863-911. 
Krizan, Zlatan and Robert S. Baron. 2007. "Group Polarization and Choice-Dilemmas: How 
Important is Self-Categorization?" European Journal of Social Psychology 37:191-201. 
Lazer, David, Brian Rubineau, Carol Chetkovich, Nancy Katz, and Michael Neblo. 2010. "The 
Coevolution of Networks and Political Attitudes." Political Communication 27:248-274. 
Mackie, Diane M. 1986. "Social Identification Effects in Group Polarization." Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology 50:720-728. 
Mackie, Diane M. and Joel Cooper. 1984. "Attitude Polarization: Effects of Group 
Membership." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 46:575-585. 
Macy, Michael W., James A. Kitts, Andreas Flache, and Stephen Benard. 2003. "A Hopfield 
Model of Emergent Structure." Pp. 162-173 in Dynamic Social Network Modeling and 
Analysis: Workshop Summary and Papers, edited by R. Breiger, K. M. Carley, and P. 
Pattison. Washington, DC: National Academies Press. 
Maitner, Angela T., Diane M. Mackie, Claypool, Heather M., and Richard J. Crisp. 2010. 
"Identity Salience Moderates Processing of Group-Relevant Information." Journal of 
Experimental Social Psychology 46:441-444. 
Marsden, Peter V. 1981. "Introducing Influence Processes into a System of Collective 
Decisions." American Journal of Sociology 86:1203-1235. 
Marsden, Peter V. and Noah E. Friedkin. 1993. "Network Studies of Social Influence." 
Sociological Methods and Research 22:127-151. 
Mäs, Michael and Andreas Flache. 2013. "Differentiation without Distancing. Explaining Bi-
Polarization of Opinions without Negative Influence." PLoS ONE 8:1-17. 
38 
 
Mäs, Michael, Andreas Flache, and James A. Kitts. 2014. "Cultural Integration and 
Differentiation in Groups and Organizations." Pp. 71-90 in Perspectives on Culture and 
Agent-based Simulations, vol. 3, Studies in the Philosophy of Sociality, edited by V. 
Dignum and F. Dignum: Springer International Publishing. 
Mason, Winter A., Frederica R. Conrey, and Eliot R. Smith. 2007. "Situating Social Influence 
Processes: Dynamic, Multidirectional Flows of Influence within Social Networks." 
Personality and Social Psychology Review 11:279-300. 
McCall, George J. and J.L. Simmons. 1978. Identities and Interactions:  An Examination of 
Human Associations in Everyday Life. New York, NY: Free Press. 
McCarty, Nolan, Keith T. Poole, and Howard Rosenthal. 2006. Polarized America: The Dance 
of Ideology and Unequal Riches. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
McClurg, Scott D. and David Lazer. 2014. "Political Networks." Social Networks 36:1-4. 
Mizruchi, Mark S. 1989. "Similarity of Political Behavior among Large American 
Corporations." American Journal of Sociology 95:401-424. 
—. 1990. "Similarity of Ideology and Party Preference among Large American Corporations: A 
Study of Political Action Committee Contributions." Sociological Forum 5:213-240. 
—. 1992. The Structure of Corporate Political Action: Interfirm Relations and Their 
Consequences. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
—. 1993. "Cohesion, Equivalence, and Similarity of Behavior: A Theoretical and Empirical 
Assessment." Social Networks 15:275-307. 
Mizruchi, Mark S. and Christopher Marquis. 2006. "Egocentric, Sociocentric, or Dyadic?: 
Identifying the Appropriate Level of Analysis in the Study of Organizational Networks." 
Social Networks 28:187-208. 
Mutz, Diana C. 2002. "Cross-Cutting Social Networks: Testing Democratic Theory in Practice." 
American Political Science Review 96:111-126. 
Nelson, Garrison  and Charles Stewart Stewart III. 2011. Committees in the US Congress, 1992-
2010. Washington, DC: CQ Press. 
Nokken, Timothy P. and Keith T. Poole. 2004. "Congressional Party Defection in American 
History." Legislative Studies Quarterly 29:545-568. 
Parigi, Paolo and Peter S. Bearman. 2008. "Spaghetti Politics: Local Electoral Systems and 
Alliance Structure in Italy, 1984-2001." Social Forces 87:623-649. 
Parigi, Paolo and Laura Sartori. 2014. "The Political Party as a Network of Cleavages: 
Disclosing the Inner Structure of Italian Political Parties in the Seventies." Social 
Networks 36:54-65. 
Poole, Keith T.  and Howard Rosenthal. 1997. Congress: A Political-Economic History of Roll 
Call Voting. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Ringe, Nils, Jennifer Nicoll Victor, and Justin H. Gross. 2013. "Keeping Your Friends Close and 
Your Enemies Closer? Information Networks in Legislative Politics." British Journal of 
Political Science 43:601-628. 
Robins, James M., Miguel A. Hernán, and Babette Brumback. 2000. "Marginal Structural 
Models and Causal Inference in Epidemiology." Epidemiology 11:550-560. 
Rubin, Donald B. 2006. Matched Sampling for Causal Effects. New York, NY: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Schienker, Barry R., David W. Dlugolecki, and Kevin Doherty. 1994. "The Impact of Self-
Presentations on Self-Appraisals and Behavior: The Power of Public Commitment." 
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 20:20-33. 
39 
 
Schildkraut, Deborah J. 2011. "National Identity in the United States." Pp. 845-865 in Handbook 
of Identity Theory and Research, edited by S. J. Schwartz, K. Luyckx, and V. L. 
Vignoles. New York: Springer Science+Business Media, LLC. 
Scott, Richard W. 2001. Institutions and Organizations. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 
Inc. 
Shayo, Moses. 2009. "A Model of Social Identity with an Application to Political Economy: 
Nation, Class, and Redistribution." American Political Science Review 103:147-174. 
Snijders, Tom A. B., Gerhard G. van de Bunt, and Christian E. G. Steglich. 2010. "Introduction 
to Stochastic Actor-Based Models for Network Dynamics." Social Networks 32:44-60. 
Somers, Margaret. 1993. "Citizenship and the Place of the Public Sphere: Law, Community, and 
Political Culture in the Transition to Democracy." American Sociological Review 58:587-
620. 
Srivastava, Sameer B. and Mahzarin R. Banaji. 2011. "Culture, Cognition, and Collaborative 
Networks in Organizations." American Sociological Review 76:207-233. 
Steglich, Christian, Tom A. B. Snijders, and Patrick West. 2006. "Applying SIENA: An 
Illustrative Analysis of the Coevolution of Adolescents' Friendship Networks, Taste in 
Music, and Alcohol Consumption." Methodology: European Journal of Research 
Methods for the Behavioral and Social Sciences 2:48-56. 
Stewart III, Charles and Jonathan Woon. 2011. "Congressional Committee Assignments, 103rd 
to 112th Congresses, 1993–2011: House of Representatives." 
Stone, Jeff and Joel Cooper. 2001. "A Self-Standards Model of Cognitive Dissonance." Journal 
of Experimental Social Psychology 37:228-243. 
Stryker, Sheldon and Peter J. Burke. 2000. "The Past, Present, and Future of an Identity Theory." 
Social Psychology Quarterly 63:284-297. 
Tajfel, H. and J.C. Turner. 1979. "An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict." Pp. 33-53 in 
The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations, edited by W. G. Austin and S. Worchel. 
Monterey, CA: Brooks-Cole. 
Theriault, Sean M. 2008. Party Polarization in Congress. New York: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Thibodeau, Ruth and Elliot Aronson. 1992. "Taking a Closer Look: Reasserting the Role of the 
Self-Concept in Dissonance Theory." Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 18:591-
602. 
Tilcsik, András and Christopher Marquis. 2013. "Punctuated Generosity: Events, Communities, 
and Corporate Philanthropy in the United States, 1980–2006." Administrative Science 
Quarterly 58:111-148. 
Turner, John C. and Katherine J. Reynolds. 2012. "Self-Categorization Theory." Pp. 399-417 in 
Handbook of Theories of Social Psychology, vol. 2, edited by P. A. M. Van Lange, A. W. 
Kruglanski, and E. T. Higgins. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Wooldridge, Jeffrey M. 2002. Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Zellner, Arnold. 1962. "An Efficient Method of Estimating Seemingly Unrelated Regressions 
and Tests for Aggregation Bias." Journal of the American Statistical Association 57:348-
368. 
 
40 
 
Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1: 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel A: Senator characteristics (N = 276) 
 Mean SD Min Max 
Female 0.043 0.204 0 1 
Democrat 0.486 0.501 0 1 
Republican 0.504 0.501 0 1 
First Congress 96.82 7.576 77 109 
Last Congress 104.3 6.839 94 112 
Tenure (in Congresses) 2.547 3.210 1 18 
Voting Behavior Index 0.012 0.383 -0.700 0.992 
Note: Sample included the 276 senators who were included in the dyad-level regressions.  
 
Panel B: Senator-dyad characteristics (N = 64,856) 
 Mean SD Min Max 
Same gender 0.912 0.283 0 1 
Same party 0.498 0.500 0 1 
Same state 0.010 0.099 0 1 
Voting distance 0.417 0.311 0.00 1.81 
Chamber distance (meters) 10.04 5.620 0.68 24.0 
Committee co-membership (count) 0.570 0.707 0 5 
Committee division  1.234 0.178 0.38 1.94 
Note: Sample included 19,038 unique dyads (i.e., ij) and 64,856 observations (i.e., ijt). For 
average committee division, we report averages only for those 29,532 dyads that had 1 or more 
shared committees.  
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Table 2: 
Distribution of Dyads by Committee Co-Membership 
# of ij committee co-
memberships 
Frequency Percent 
0 35,324 54.47 
1 22,901 35.31 
2 5,892 9.08 
3 694 1.07 
4 41 0.06 
5 4 0.01 
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Table 3: 
Mean Voting Distance by Type of Dyad, Over the Observation Period 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 All Dyads Same Party 
Dyads 
Different 
Party Dyads 
Pre-existing- 
Same Party 
Dyads 
Pre-existing- 
Different 
Party Dyads 
First Year- 
Same Party 
Dyads 
First Year- 
Different 
Party Dyads 
94
th
 Congress 0.401 0.235 0.569 0.247 0.559 0.163 0.794 
95
th
 Congress 0.389 0.230 0.556 0.252 0.535 0.197 0.630 
96
th
 Congress 0.359 0.174 0.545 0.179 0.524 0.183 0.556 
97
th
 Congress 0.381 0.198 0.555 0.211 0.539 0.217 0.621 
98
th
 Congress 0.377 0.200 0.555 0.211 0.535 0.144 0.683 
99
th
 Congress 0.387 0.213 0.559 0.236 0.527 0.122 0.783 
100
th
 Congress 0.389 0.171 0.606 0.192 0.536 0.141 0.638 
101
st
 Congress 0.398 0.171 0.625 0.216 0.635 0.161 0.585 
102
nd
 Congress 0.407 0.174 0.642 0.197 0.634 0.300 1.080 
103
rd
   Congress 0.421 0.173 0.671 0.211 0.632 0.165 0.870 
104
th
 Congress 0.445 0.180 0.708 0.176 0.615 0.222 NA 
105
th
 Congress 0.468 0.184 0.753 0.192 0.709 0.188 0.800 
106
th
 Congress 0.473 0.179 0.767 0.188 0.725 0.162 0.749 
107
th
 Congress 0.466 0.176 0.751 0.159 0.920 0.185 0.708 
108
th
 Congress 0.447 0.163 0.715 0.091 0.744 0.112 0.687 
109
th
 Congress 0.481 0.182 0.770 0.093 0.672 0.256 0.937 
Note: Mean voting distances were based upon Nokken and Poole’s (2004) measure. We defined pre-existing dyads as dyads composed of senators 
who both entered before the 96
th
 Congress. First-year dyads consisted of senators who both entered in the given Congress. For the 104
th
 Congress, 
all entering first-year senators were Republicans.  
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Table 4: OLS Regressions of Distance in Voting Behavior on Interaction and Political Identity 
(H1a, H1b—interaction based on chamber distance) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Chamber Distance 
-0.002*** -0.004*** -0.004***  
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001)  
Committee Co-Membership 
0.003* 0.003* 0.003* 0.003*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Chamber Distance X Same Party  
 0.005***   
 (0.001)   
Chamber Distance X Same Party-Republican 
  0.005***  
  (0.001)  
Chamber Distance X Same Party-Democrat 
  0.005***  
  (0.001)  
Chamber Distance  
(0-2 meters) 
   0.055*** 
   (0.016) 
Chamber Distance  
(2-10 meters) 
   0.038*** 
   (0.007) 
Chamber Distance  
(10-15 meters) 
   0.019*** 
   (0.004) 
Chamber Distance  
(0-2 meters) X Same Party 
   -0.062** 
   (0.020) 
Chamber Distance  
(2-10 meters) X Same Party 
   -0.043** 
   (0.014) 
Chamber Distance  
(10-15 meters) X Same Party 
   -0.019 
   (0.012) 
Prior Bill Co-Sponsorships (Log) 
-0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.005 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Constant 
0.443*** 0.450*** 0.450*** 0.415*** 
(0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.014) 
Congress Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Dyad Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
prob>Chi2 5.9e-199 9.2e-239 1.7e-238 1.9e-226 
N 64856 64856 64856 64856 
Note: Chamber Distance (75-100%) was the excluded category in Model 4. The summed tenure of i and 
j was included, but not shown. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Two-tailed tests. Standard errors 
clustered in two dimensions: by i and by j. 
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Table 5: OLS Regressions of Distance in Voting Behavior on Interaction and Political Identity 
(H1a, H1b—interaction based on committee co-membership and integrated model) 
 (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Chamber Distance 
-0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.004*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Committee Co-Membership 
0.007** 0.007**  0.006** 
(0.002) (0.002)  (0.002) 
Same Party X Committee Co-
Membership 
-0.009***   -0.006** 
(0.002)   (0.002) 
Same Party-Republican X 
Committee Co-Membership 
 -0.005*   
 (0.002)   
Same Party-Democrat X Committee 
Co-Membership 
 -0.013***   
 (0.003)   
Single (1) Committee Co-
Membership 
  0.006*  
  (0.002)  
Multiple (>1) Committee Co-
Membership 
  0.017***  
  (0.004)  
Single (1) Committee Co-
Membership X Same Party  
  -0.009**  
  (0.003)  
Multiple (>1) Committee Co-
Membership X Same Party 
  -0.019***  
  (0.005)  
Chamber Distance X Same Party 
   0.005*** 
   (0.001) 
Prior Bill Co-Sponsorships (Log) 
-0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Constant 
0.443*** 0.443*** 0.443*** 0.449*** 
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) 
Congress Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Dyad Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
prob>Chi2 3.1e-203 5.7e-206 6.6e-205 4.1e-240 
N 64856 64856 64856 64856 
Note: No Committee Co-Membership (i.e., zero shared committees) was the excluded category in 
Model 7. The summed tenure of i and j was included, but not shown. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** 
p<0.001. Two-tailed tests. Standard errors clustered in two dimensions: by i and by j. 
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Table 6: OLS Regressions of Distance in Voting Behavior on Committee Co-Memberships and 
Political Identity, by Committee Division (H2) 
 (9) (10) (11) 
Chamber Distance 
-0.002*** -0.002*** -0.004*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Committee Co-Membership Count (Less 
Divided) 
0.004 0.004 0.003 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Committee Co-Membership Count 
(More Divided) 
0.002 0.009** 0.008** 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Committee Co-Membership Count (Less 
Divided) X Same Party 
 -0.001 0.000 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
Committee Co-Membership Count 
(More Divided) X Same Party 
 -0.015*** -0.012*** 
 (0.004) (0.003) 
Chamber Distance X Same Party 
  0.005*** 
  (0.001) 
Prior Bill Co-Sponsorships (Log) 
-0.006 -0.006 -0.006 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Constant 
0.443*** 0.442*** 0.449*** 
(0.015) (0.015) (0.016) 
Congress Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Dyad Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
prob>Chi2 2.9e-202 1.8e-211 3.2e-247 
N 64856 64856 64856 
Note: Less divided committees were those in which the ratio of same- to cross-party bill co-sponsorship 
rates was below the median, while more divided committees were those with ratios above the median. 
The summed tenure of i and j was included, but not shown. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Two-
tailed tests. Standard errors clustered in two dimensions: by i and by j. 
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Table 7: OLS Regressions of Distance in Voting Behavior on Interaction and Political Identity 
(H1a, H1b—political identity based on the religiosity of senators’ constituents) 
 (12) (13) (14) 
Data i & j represent states with 0-25% or 75-100% religiosity 
Chamber Distance 
-0.002** -0.003** -0.005*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Committee Co-Membership 
0.003 0.003 0.003 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Chamber Distance X Same State 
Religiosity 
 0.002* 0.002* 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Chamber Distance X Same Party 
  0.006*** 
  (0.001) 
Prior Bill Co-Sponsorships (Log) 
-0.005 -0.005 -0.006 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Constant 
0.471*** 0.470*** 0.483*** 
(0.024) (0.024) (0.025) 
Congress Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Dyad Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
prob>Chi2 2.77e-65 7.91e-66 3.93e-84 
N 14851 14851 14851 
Note: The regression only included dyads where i and j represented states that were either in the least 
religious (0-25%) quartile or in the most religious (75-100%) quartile. The variable Same State 
Religiosity was an indicator variable set to 1 if both i and j represented states with the same religiosity 
quartile (i.e., both 0-25% or both 75-100%), and set to 0 if otherwise (e.g., one 0-25% and one 75-
100%). The summed tenure of i and j was included, but not shown. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. 
Two-tailed tests. Standard errors clustered in two dimensions: by i and by j. 
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Figure 1: 
Distribution of Senators’ Aggregate Voting Behavior on Spectrum from Liberal to Conservative 
 
Note: Senators’ aggregate voting behavior was based on Nokken and Poole’s (2004) 
variant of the DW-Nominate measure (Poole and Rosenthal 1997). This linear 
distribution was used to generate voting distances between all ij combinations.   
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Figure 2: 
U.S. Senate—Map of the Chamber Floor 
 
Note: Map of Senate Chamber seating for the 99
th
 Congress (1985–
1987). The Chamber’s dimensions are approximately 16 x 26 
meters. Republicans were seated on the right side of the Chamber 
and Democrats were seated to the left.  
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Figure 3: 
Distribution of Chamber Distance between Dyadic Pairs 
 
Note: Chamber Distances are shown for the 64,856 dyads in our sample. Using historical data 
on desk locations in the Senate Chamber, each senator’s location was translated into Cartesian 
space. The distance between senators was then computed using the Pythagorean Theorem.  
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Figure 4: 
Distribution of Committee Division  
 
Note: We used the ratio of same- to different-party bill co-sponsorships, to measure how 
divided each committee is at a given point in time. Higher ratios, to the right in the 
histogram, indicated greater proportions of within-party bill co-sponsorships, consistent with 
a divided environment within that committee.  
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Appendix: Additional Robustness Checks 
 
Although the use of dyad-level models was justified based on principles of model 
selection and was consistent with the approach taken in several prominent prior studies 
(see Endnote 2), we implemented two additional sets of analyses to ensure the robustness 
of the findings.  
A1. Robustness Checks with Dyad-Level Models 
First, although the use of dyad fixed effects (i.e., the within-dyad estimator) represented a 
conservative choice in that it accounted for all unobserved, time-invariant traits of each 
member of the dyad and of the dyadic pair, it resulted in our estimates being based on the 
subset of dyads that experienced change. Although a Hausman test (Wooldridge 2002) 
favored the use of fixed effects over random effects, we estimated random effects models 
to: (1) enable estimation of certain time-invariant controls that were otherwise subsumed 
in the dyad fixed effects; and (2) enable estimation on the whole network (i.e., the full set 
of dyads in the sample). We also included in these models: (3) a measure of triadic 
closure based on bill co-sponsorships; and (4) certain time-varying controls, such as 
whether members of the dyadic pair were both committee chairs, which were potentially 
related to interpersonal influence. These results are reported in Table A1, Models A1-1 
through A1-3. In Model A1-1, the baseline, Same Party and Prior Bill Co-Sponsorships 
(Log), had negative and significant coefficients. Relative to dyads in which neither 
member was a committee chair, dyads in which both members were committee chairs 
also tended to converge in their subsequent voting behavior. Relative to mixed gender 
dyads, both-male dyads tended to diverge while both-female dyads tended to converge in 
voting behavior. Model A1-2 included the relevant interaction terms to test H1a and H1b 
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and replicated the results of Table 5, Model 8. Similarly, Model A1-3 included the 
relevant interaction terms to test H2 and replicated the results of Table 6, Model 11.  
Second, we retained the measure of triadic closure and the time-varying controls 
but reverted to dyad fixed effects. Model A1-4 represented the baseline. Note that Same 
Party, Same Gender-Male, and Same Gender-Female could no longer be directly 
estimated because they were subsumed in the dyad fixed effects. Model A1-5 included 
the interaction terms to test H1a and H1b and once again replicated the findings from 
Table 5, Model 8. Similarly, Model A1-6 included the interaction terms to test H2 and 
replicated the findings from Table 6, Model 11. 
In sum, these supplemental analyses provided confidence that our results were 
robust to estimation on the whole network of all dyads, to random effects specification, 
to the inclusion of time-invariant controls that would otherwise be subsumed in dyad 
fixed effects, to the inclusion of time-varying controls associated with interpersonal 
influence, and to the inclusion of a measure of triadic closure.  
*****Table A1 about here*****  
A2. Robustness Checks with Individual-Level Models 
To provide further reassurance that our results were not an artifact of our choice to use 
dyad-level models, we implemented additional robustness checks at the individual-level 
of analysis. This approach was more coarse-grained than the dyad-level analyses because 
it required aggregating the effects of interaction on influence across all senators with 
whom a focal senator interacted. Nevertheless, if this individual-level analysis replicated 
findings from the dyad-level analysis, it would further mitigate concerns that the findings 
reported above were an artifact of the modeling choice. 
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For each senator, we computed as dependent variables his or her distance from 
the mean voting behavior of his or her own party and the distance from the mean voting 
behavior of the other party. For simplicity (given the non-linear relationship between 
physical distance and influence described above), we focused this analysis on interaction 
as measured by committee co-memberships. We then generated a lagged count of the 
number of committee co-memberships the focal senator had with senators from the same 
party, as well as a lagged count of the number of committee co-memberships the focal 
senator had with senators from the other party. 
Because an increase in committee co-memberships with same or different party 
senators is expected to simultaneously affect the focal senator’s distance from the same-
party and from the different-party mean, we estimated both models together using 
Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (Wooldridge 2002; Zellner 1962) with robust standard 
errors. In all models, we included individual-level controls (e.g., party affiliation, 
seniority) that could be associated with interpersonal influence.  
Table A2 presents these results. Models A2-7a and A2-7b together tested 
Hypothesis 1a. Having more committee co-memberships with senators from the same 
party led to a subsequent decrease in voting distance from the same-party mean and a 
subsequent increase in voting distance from the other-party mean. Thus, the individual-
level analyses also supported Hypothesis 1a. Models A2-8a and A2-8b together tested 
Hypothesis 1b. Having more committee co-memberships with senators from the other 
party led to a subsequent increase in voting distance from the other party mean and a 
subsequent decrease in voting distance from the same party mean. Again, the individual-
level analyses also supported Hypothesis 1b. As for the magnitude of this effect, a one 
54 
 
standard deviation increase in the number of committee co-memberships with senators 
from the same party led to a 7.5% decrease in the distance from the same-party mean and 
a 3% increase in the distance from the other-party mean. Comparable effect sizes were 
obtained for a one standard deviation increase in the number of committee co-
memberships with senators from the other party. Models A2-9a, A2-9b, A2-10a, and A2-
10b together tested Hypothesis 2, demonstrating at the individual level that the effects of 
political identity on interpersonal influence were operative in more divided senate 
committees.  
*****Table A2 about here*****  
Taken together, these two supplemental analyses—at the dyadic level and at the 
individual level—demonstrated that the main findings were robust to alternative 
modeling approaches, different specifications, time-varying controls, and triad-level 
controls. We nevertheless acknowledge that these analyses could not account for 
unobserved, time-varying factors that could be associated with interpersonal influence.   
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Table A1: OLS Regressions of Distance in Voting Behavior on Chamber Distance, Committee Co-Memberships  
and Political Identity—with individual, dyad, network controls 
 
 (A1-1) (A1-2) (A1-3) (A1-4) (A1-5) (A1-6) 
Chamber Distance 
-0.001** -0.003** -0.003** -0.002*** -0.004*** -0.004*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Committee Co-Membership 
0.003* 0.008***  0.003* 0.006***  
(0.001) (0.002)  (0.001) (0.002)  
Same Party 
-0.457*** -0.482*** -0.481***    
(0.022) (0.025) (0.025)    
Chamber Distance X Same Party 
 0.003*** 0.003***  0.005*** 0.005*** 
 (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) 
Committee Co-Membership X Same Party 
 -0.011***   -0.006**  
 (0.002)   (0.002)  
Committee Co-Membership Count (Less 
Divided) 
  -0.003   0.004 
  (0.003)   (0.003) 
Committee Co-Membership Count (More 
Divided) 
  0.014***   0.008** 
  (0.002)   (0.003) 
Committee Co-Membership Count (Less 
Divided) X Same Party 
  0.002   0.000 
  (0.003)   (0.003) 
Committee Co-Membership Count (More 
Divided) X Same Party 
  -0.023***   -0.012*** 
  (0.004)   (0.003) 
Sum of Tenures 
0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Prior Bill Co-Sponsorship (Log) 
-0.015*** -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Triadic Closure 
-0.003 -0.004 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Either i or j is committee chair 
0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 -0.000 -0.001 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Both i & j are committee chairs 
-0.012*** -0.012** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.012*** 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Same Gender - Male 
0.032* 0.032* 0.032*    
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014)    
Same Gender - Female 
-0.102** -0.100** -0.100**    
(0.034) (0.034) (0.034)    
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Constant 
0.685*** 0.683*** 0.682*** 0.446*** 0.452*** 0.451*** 
(0.031) (0.032) (0.031) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Congress Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Dyad Fixed Effects No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Chi2 25431.690 25457.811 25736.834    
prob>Chi2 0 0 0 6.5e-163 1.0e-193 3.2e-195 
N 64856 64856 64856 64856 64856 64856 
Note: Models A1-1/A1-4, A1-2/A1-5, and A1-3/1-A6 correspond to Table 4, Model 1, Table 5, Model 8, and Table 6, Model 11, respectively. 
Triadic closure was the count of k individuals, where k ≠ i and k ≠ j, and k had more than the median number of bill co-sponsorships with both i 
and j. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Two-tailed tests. Standard errors clustered in two dimensions: by i and by j. 
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Table A2: Seeming Unrelated Regression Regression of Same / Different Party Voting Distance on the  
Lagged Count of Same / Different Party Committee Memberships 
 
 (A2-7a) (S2-7b) (A2-8a) (A2-8b) (A2-9a) (A2-9b) (A2-10a) (A2-10b) 
DV 
Same-Party 
Voting 
Distance 
Diff-Party 
Voting 
Distance 
Same-Party 
Voting 
Distance 
Diff-Party 
Voting 
Distance 
Same-Party 
Voting 
Distance 
Diff-Party 
Voting 
Distance 
Same-Party 
Voting 
Distance 
Diff-Party 
Voting 
Distance 
# of Same Party 
CoMembers-All 
-0.0012*** 0.0020***       
(0.0003) (0.0005)       
# of Same Party 
CoMembers-Divided 
    -0.0013*** 0.0070***   
    (0.0003) (0.0005)   
# of Different Party 
CoMembers-All 
  -0.0014*** 0.0019***     
  (0.0003) (0.0005)     
# of Different Party 
CoMembers-Divided 
      -0.0014*** 0.0067*** 
      (0.0003) (0.0005) 
Democrat 
-0.0568*** 0.0169 -0.0632*** 0.0263* -0.05877*** 0.0217* -0.0618*** 0.0363*** 
(0.0057) (0.0100) (0.0061) (0.0105) (0.0058) (0.0096) (0.0059) (0.0099) 
Female 
0.0164 -0.0222 0.0176 -0.0223 0.0186 -0.0643** 0.0196 -0.0635** 
(0.0117) (0.0210) (0.0116) (0.0213) (0.0119) (0.0198) (0.0119) (0.0207) 
Senior Member 
0.0064 -0.0440** 0.0058 -0.0434** 0.0047 -0.0290* 0.0042 -0.0283* 
(0.0075) (0.0140) (0.0075) (0.0140) (0.0075) (0.0136) (0.0075) (0.0136) 
Tenure 
-0.0015 0.0064** -0.0016* 0.0063** -0.0007 0.0061** -0.0006 0.0058** 
(0.0012) (0.0022) (0.0012) (0.0022) (0.0011) (0.0021) (0.0011) (0.0021) 
Constant 
0.1737*** 0.6805*** 0.1819*** 0.6741*** 0.1643*** 0.6306*** 0.1683*** 0.6215*** 
(0.0137) (0.0252) (0.0147) (0.0261) (0.0127) (0.0230) (0.0129) (0.0232) 
Chi2 108.29 108.57 109.21 110.58 
Number of 
Observations 
1470 1470 1470 1470 
Note: Same-Party Voting Distance is the absolute distance of i’s Nokken and Poole (2004) score to the mean score of i’s same party colleagues in 
Congress t. Diff-Party Voting Distance is the absolute distance of i’s Nokken and Poole (2004) score to the mean score of i’s opposition party 
colleagues in Congress t. “CoMembers” is the count of j senators who share committee co-memberships with i, split across same/different party 
and all/divided committees. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Two-tailed tests. Robust standard errors. 
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Endnotes 
 
 
                                                          
1
 There are at least two plausible ways in which committee division could make political identities salient. First, senators may observe colleagues on a committee 
who have a known history of past conflict. Second, certain committees may be more inclined than others to grapple with key divisive issues such as health care 
reform or abortion. In many divided committees, we expect that both factors are likely at play simultaneously and jointly serve to activate the political identities 
of committee members. We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for helping to clarify this point. 
2
 Mizruchi and Marquis (2006) argued that dyad-level models are superior to individual-level models when: (1) the dependent variable is quantitative (rather than 
a discrete event); (2) the dependent variable is a composite of a large number of individual events; and (3) the predictors of theoretical interest are relational 
variables. In our case, the dependent variable, a continuous measure that ranges from 0 to 2, was clearly quantitative. In addition, the dependent variable—an 
index of voting behavior on a linear spectrum of conservative to liberal—was derived from a composite based on thousands of individual roll call votes made by 
each senator (Poole and Rosenthal 1997). Finally, our predictor variables of interest—whether or not two senators have matching or opposed political identities, 
changes in the physical distance and number of shared comemberships between pairs of senators, and the interaction of these two sets of variables—were clearly 
relational (dyadic) in nature. Thus, we believe that our empirical set-up met all three of Mizruchi and Marquis’ proposed criteria for the selection of dyad-level 
models over individual-level models. Other prominent empirical studies of the similarity or dissimilarity of actors’ behavior have also used dyad-level analyses 
(see, for example, Burris [2005]; Dreiling and Darves [2011]; Mizruchi [1992]; and Mizruchi and Marquis [2006].) Nevertheless, to ensure that our results were 
not simply an artifact of our choice to use dyad-level models, we implemented a number of robustness checks (see Appendix), including an analysis at the 
individual level that that replicated the main findings from our dyad-level analyses. We thank an anonymous reviewer for prompting us to implement these 
robustness checks.  
3
 Independents constitute only 1% (i.e., 3 senators) of the sample. Although they do not forge political identities that are consistently at odds with one of the other 
parties, we retain these senators in our main analyses. Our results are robust to the exclusion of Independents from the sample.   
4
 Results were substantively unchanged when we used different category cutoffs (e.g., quartiles). 
5
 Comparable effect sizes were obtained using individual-level models (see discussion of Appendix, Table A-2). 
6
 In supplemental analyses (not reported), we investigated: (1) whether there was a time trend related to these effects; and (2) whether the effects were 
concentrated in dyads consisting of more or less senior senators. We did not find any systematic or consistent evidence of such variation. 
7
 http://www.gallup.com/poll/153479/Mississippi-Religious-State.aspx#1; accessed March 14, 2014 
8
 For this supplemental analysis, we focused on chamber distance rather than committee co-membership as the indicator of interaction because religiosity is not 
salient to deliberations on all committees. By contrast, physical space represents a more generalized locus of interaction. 
